

# ТАРИХ – ИСТОРИЯ – HISTORY

---

UDC 94

IRSTI 03.00.00

DOI 10.37238/2960-1371.2960-138X.2024.94(2).47

<sup>1</sup>Zhurasova Altynai\*, <sup>2</sup>Bulatov Ivan

<sup>1</sup>M. Utemisov West Kazakhstan University, Uralsk, Kazakhstan

<sup>2</sup>Saratov State Technical University named after Yu.A.Gagarin, Saratov,  
Russian Federation

\*Corresponding author: [azhurasova@mail.ru](mailto:azhurasova@mail.ru)

E-mail: [azhurasova@mail.ru](mailto:azhurasova@mail.ru), [bulatovivan64@gmail.com](mailto:bulatovivan64@gmail.com)

## HISTORY OF THE KATYN TRAGEDY

**Annotation.** There are many political issues that take place in the history of the Second World War, one of which is the Katyn tragedy. It went down in history as one of the mass killings of the 20th century. In this regard, the article tells the story of the terrible Katyn incident involving the Polish military, which took place at the beginning of the Second World War. The article analyzes the history of the incident and the positions of states related to it, the historical features and significance of the Katyn massacre. The novelty of the article is to analyze the versions related to the history of Katyn based on scientific research.

**Keywords:** Katyn; war; tragedy; officer; prisoner; USSR; NKVD; convention; Red Cross; Strasbourg court.

### *Introduction*

Katyn is the collective name of the Polish national tragedy that massacred Poles in various regions of the USSR inhabited by Poles in the spring of 1940. The exact number of victims is unknown, it is said that from about 16 to 40 thousand people. It was in the Katyn forest that a large group of the Polish military elite was destroyed in 1940.

In Russia and Poland, this issue was perceived differently, not because of the fact, but mostly due to the presentation of this fact, as a case of the complex history of relations between Poland and Russia, as well as the complex history "taken out of context" in the first half of the 20th century, or part of the formation of Poland as a sovereign state and it was manifested as the existence of an irreversible rivalry between Russia / USSR and Germany.

In Russia and Poland, the different perception of this issue is largely due not to the fact of what happened, but to the reflection of this fact - as one of the cases of the complex history of relations between Poland and Russia, as well as the complex history



"taken out of context" of the first half of the 20th century or part of the formation. Therefore, from the point of view of opposition and definition of the problem of historical events, this topic is relevant and in demand.

Because the identification of differences in the Soviet-Russian, German and Polish-Western versions of the Katyn tragedy, the analysis of the results of the Strasbourg process in connection with the death of the Polish military, the study of the prospects for the influence of the "Katyn" factor on Russian-Polish relations is very important in determining the problem.

#### *Research materials and methods*

The tragic fate of Polish officers in the Soviet Union was an unexplored, closed question in Soviet historical science. Despite the fact that the works of Polish researchers abroad on this issue began to appear already in the first post-war years, Soviet official historiography tried to ignore this issue. After the end of World War II, the topic of events in Katyn among Soviet publicists and researchers was not raised. By tacit agreement of the world community, it was a single approach to events. Because of this, the attempt to bring it to light or revise it was meaningless and even, to some extent, dangerous.

The increased interest in this issue appeared due to changes in foreign policy since the late 80s. And since the 90s, Russian researchers N.S. Lebedeva, I. Tsynman, F. Grofer, Prudnikova E. I.I. Kaliganov and others paid special attention to the Katyn incident, including N.S. Lebedeva's works have a special place.

The increase in interest in this issue arose due to changes in foreign policy since the end of the 80s. And since the 90s, Russian researchers A.N.Yakovlev, N.S.Lebedeva, V.K.Abarinov paid special attention to the Katyn incident, including the works of N. S. Lebedeva [1]. Since then, the number of publications of research and collections of documents has increased significantly, and a number of collections of documents have been published [2].

The researchers considered this issue critically, work was carried out with archival documents that were previously inaccessible. As a result of scientific and political processes, by 2010 the official Russian version of the events of the Katyn massacre was formed. In parallel with the change of version, the works of Yu.I.Mukhin, V.N.Swede and many other researchers were published in support of the Soviet developments. They suggested that the versions of the story were not fully developed, it needed political overtones. The opinions and views of these researchers served as a scientific and methodological basis for the analysis of the Katyn scourge.

The analysis of the problem in the article was used to identify common and distinctive features through the historical - systematic method. The historical and genetic method of determining the range of issues discussed in relation to the Katyn tragedy was believed. A historical and comparative method was used, which made it possible to compare the estimates of Russian and foreign researchers in different periods;

#### *Research results*

In World War II, all warring countries took as a basis the Geneva Convention of 1929 "on the detention of prisoners of war" on the issue of prisoners of war. Under this convention, prisoners of war are under the power of the government of the Captive



State. This principle, firstly, prevents the abuse of prisoners of war by individual military groups and persons, secondly, sets certain international legal tasks for the protection of prisoners before the governments of the Warring States, and thirdly, gives the governments of the warring countries the opportunity to bring charges against each other for violating the rules for the protection of prisoners of war. The convention specified all the rights of military men in the period from the moment of their capture to repatriation, and established in full the duties of the governments of the captive States. According to the convention: prisoners are registered and their lists are transferred to Switzerland as a protectorate state; prisoner camps are checked by representatives of the Red Cross; the amount of food provided to prisoners must be in the amount provided to the rear military units of the captive country; prisoners have the right to receive parcels from their country and receive food, vitamins, medicines from the Red Cross, and file a statement about the difficult situation in the camp. According to the convention, the observance of the rights of prisoners of warring countries should be monitored by the governments of neutral countries. In cases not specified in the convention, civilians and captured troops of warring countries must be protected by the provisions of international law based on the human customs and law established among civilized peoples [1,p.28]. The Soviet Union did not join this agreement, which was approved by 47 states. The consequences of the Soviet government's non-recognition of the Geneva Convention, which established the international legal status of prisoners of war, were clearly reflected in the fate of the Polish prisoners of war captured in 1939.

On September 1, 1939, German fascist invaders invade the territory of independent Poland. In a few days, Britain and France will declare war on Germany, but will not take any serious action. At this time, the Soviet government, seeing a staunch opponent from the poles, orders the Red Army to infiltrate Polish lands. On September 15, by Order No. 01, an order is issued to seize and destroy the Armed Forces of Poland. On September 17, The Red Army enters the lands of eastern Poland. Thus, without declaring war, the Soviet government invades Polish lands in violation of the peace treaty of 1921, the non-aggression treaty of 1932. The Soviet side explained this action as the need to protect Ukrainians and Belarusians living in this region. The occupation of Poland involves the Ukrainian, Belarusian fronts, the Minsk Group, the Bobruisk group, the Eastern Army Group, and the Southern Group. During 15 days of military action, the Red Army captures a territory with a population of 12 million people, 157,000 Polish soldiers[2,p.97].

As soon as the red troops crossed the border with Poland, orders began to be issued regarding prisoners of war. On September 19, 1939, the people's commissar of Defense of the USSR K.E.Voroshilov issued Order No. 0308 to send all prisoners of war to the Special Department of the people's Commissariat of internal affairs. By order, Ostashkov, Yukhnov, Kozelsk, Putivl, Kozelshansk, Starobelsk, Yuzhsk, Oransk camps for prisoners of war were created. According to the International Convention, a prisoner of war is not considered an enemy of the government or other political groups of the captive country, the prisoner of war does not have to be at all related to the domestic policy of the country that captured him, therefore, in other countries, prisoners of war were dealt with by military institutions, and in the Soviet Union, prisoners of war



were transferred to the jurisdiction of the people's Commissariat of internal affairs[3,p.124].

On the occupied territory, the NKVD of the USSR Forms 8 camps for captive poles. In the instruction of December 29, 1939 "on the work of places for receiving prisoners of war", Officers, government officials, police gendarmes and "members of counter-revolutionary organizations" were ordered to be placed in separate camps. The bulk of the officers were stationed in the Starobelsk, Ostashkov, Kozelsk camps. In November 1939, there were 4,727 prisoners in the Kozelsk camp, including 1 Admiral – Xaveriy Chernetsky, 4 generals (B. Bogaterevich, H.Minkevich, M.Smoravinsky, E.Volkovitsky), there were 24 colonels, 79 lieutenant colonels, 258 majors, 654 captains, 17 Navy captains, 3420 officers of other formations, 7 chaplains. Among them were 21 employees of higher educational institutions, 300 doctors, engineers, law enforcement officers, teachers, 200 pilot officers who were drafted into the army on the eve of the war. In Starobelsk, 8 generals (L.Billevich, S.Galler, A.Kovalevsky, K.Lukovsky, F.Sikorsky, K.Pli-sovsky, L.Skersky, P.Skuratovich), there were 55 colonels, 127 lieutenant colonels, 316 majors, 846 captains, 2529 officers of other formations, 18 chaplains, 1 police colonel, 1 military educational institution employee, 600 pilot officers, many chaplains, more than 10 higher educational institution employees, hundreds of engineers and teachers. About half of the generals in these two camps were those who retired from military service due to their age. In the Ostashkov camp, 5963 prisoners were imprisoned, in it 5033 police officers (of which 300 were police officers, 40 were in the ranks of gendarmes), 41 people were from the border guard [4, pp.10, 20-21 ].

During September, about 500 thousand Polish citizens pass through these camps, and more than half are released. In addition, 130,242 people, including both gendarmes, officers, policemen and ordinary privates of the Polish Army, are left in camps by the NKVD. All these were suspected by the Soviet leadership of nationalist and anti-Soviet propaganda.

In October 1939, the Politburo of the BCP (B) decided to release privates of the Polish army and transferred about 40 thousand people arrested in Western and central Poland to the Wehrmacht of the USSR. By the end of the year, about 41,700 people remain in captivity of the Soviet troops.

Until March 1940, the Soviet leadership would not take any action against the prisoners, and only on March 3, L.Beria would begin to consider shooting events in relation to the Polish contingent.

In March 1940, L.Beria's letter to I.Stalin provided the following information on the number of Polish officers in these camps:

1) 14,736 Polish military men are detained in the camps of prisoners of war, including generals, colonels and lieutenant – colonels -295, majors and captains – 2,080, poruchiks, podporuchiks and horunjians – 6,049, officers and junior commanders of the police, border guard and gendarmerie – 1,030, ordinary police officers, gendarmes, prison servants and scouts – 5,138, bureaucrats, xendz and osadniks-144;

2) in the prisons of the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus there are 18,632 prisoners, including 1,207 former officers, 5,141 former police Scouts and gendarmes, 347 spies and spoilers, 465 former landowners, factory workers and bureaucrats, 5,345



members of various counter – revolutionary and insurgent organizations, 6,127 fugitives.

Calling these, Beria reported to Stalin that the NKVD considered them "uncompromising, irreparable enemies" of the Soviet authorities and intended to specifically consider the issue of granting them the most severe punishment – the death penalty. On March 5, 1940, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to execute 14,700 Polish prisoners of war from this mentioned first group, and 11,000 from the second [5,p.130].

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) accepted his proposal:

"...for the consideration of cases in a special order, the highest type of punishment is applied against them – the death penalty. Consideration of cases without summoning prisoners and announcing charges, a resolution on the completion of the investigation and an indictment. ...consideration of cases and decision-making should be entrusted to three comrades V. E. Merkulov, B. Kobulov and Bashtakov (head of the 1st Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR)" [6,p.97].

By the end of March, poyalk prisoners of war in the Starobelsk (4 thousand), Kozelsk (5 thousand), Ostashkovsk (4.7 thousand) camps, as well as working on road construction (18 thousand) and in the Krivoy Rog Basin (10 thousand) will be sent to the shooting sites – to the Katyn Forest and some camps and prisons in western Belarus and western Ukraine. Most were named near the Starobelsky and ostashkovsky camps.

Polish officers and gendarmes are brought to the shooting sites in echelons loaded with 350-400 people. The order of shooting at each shooting range could be different from each other: for example, in the Katyn Forest, prisoners were tied up, brought to a pre-dug trench and shot in the back of the head. When fired, they fired only with German cartridges, which is why for a long time it seemed that the Soviet side had nothing to do with this tragedy. 21,857 people became victims of these shootings. The Soviet leadership shoots half of the prisoners in an anti-Soviet mood[7,p.114].

And the other half of the pro-Bolshevik views are brought to Moscow prisons in the fall of 1940, from there they are taken to dachas near Moscow, where the leaders of the Katyn massacre V. Merkulov and L. Beria come to them. The goals of the arrival were to create a Polish Red Army to fight the German invaders.

Soviet officers appointed to establish the connection between the two sides in the creation of the Polish Army spread speculation that Polish prisoners from these three camps were released from custody and returned to Poland in 1940. General Vladyslav Anders, the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, which was being formed on Soviet soil, instructed one of the 79 surviving prisoners in the Starobelsk camp, rotmister Yuzef Chapsky, who was released from the Gryazovetsk camp, to collect data on the missing officers in these camps. At the same time, General Anders and the Polish ambassador to the Soviet Union Stanislav Kot tried to determine the fate of Polish officers at meetings with Soviet leaders. On November 14, 1941, when S. Kot was at the reception of I. V. Stalin, the head of the Soviet Union said that all Polish citizens were completely released from custody. The Polish government in London also regularly asked the Soviet government about the fate of Polish officers. On July 27, 1942, the Polish government handed over to the Soviet government a note on the search for 8,000 officers[8,p.123]. In the response of the Soviet government, which was given



a long delay, there was a vague allegation that Polish prisoners of war could hide in their homeland or abroad, and die on the way. Thus, the Soviet authorities were constantly distracted from direct answers.

After the capture of Smolensk by the Germans, in February-March 1943, the Germans carried out excavations at this place and found places where Polish officers were buried in droves. On April 11, representatives of local Poles visited the excavation site and saw with their own eyes the corpses of their compatriots.

This causes different views and demands from Russia, Germany, and Poland at that time. The German side accused it of the bloody policy of the Soviet Union and formed its own version of the incident. Radio Moscow broadcast a report accusing the Germans of mass killings of Polish officers. The leadership of the Soviet Union did not recognize the fact of the shooting of Polish officers in the spring of 1940. According to the official version, the German side claims that in 1943 it was used for propaganda purposes against the Soviet Union in order to prevent the surrender of German soldiers and to attract the nations of Western Europe to participate in the war.

The new head of the Polish government, Mikolajczyk, did not want to escalate the diplomatic conflict.

This gives rise to various views and claims on the part of the Rsei, Gemrania, Poland in the same period. The German side accused this of a bloody policy of the Soviet country, and Radio Moscow gave a message accusing it of the Germans themselves who massacred Polish officers. Therefore The Polish newspaper " Dziennik Polski "said:" This monstrous accusation is probably another lie of German propaganda aimed at destroying Polish-Russian relations. On the other hand, the fate of Polish officers who were in the Kozelsk and Starobelsk prisoner of war camps is still unknown, and it causes great concern in the Polish community," he wrote [9,p.223].

The British and US governments wanted Soviet-Polish relations not to be strained in order to preserve the anti-Hitler alliance. British Foreign Minister A. Eden met with W. Sikorski and talked about the non-volatile Soviet-Polish relations. V. Sikorski promised not to make persistent demands on the International Red Cross to check the Katyn issue. On April 25, W. Churchill wrote a letter to Stalin, in which he reported a conversation with V. Sikorski, warned that the purpose of German propaganda was to build fire between the allies and asked not to break relations with Poland. However, the Soviet leaders had no intention of stopping at this. On April 25, 1943, the people's commissar of foreign affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov handed over a note from the Soviet government to the ambassador of Poland. The note assessed all that was happening regarding the Katyn issue as a false slander directed against the Soviet Union, accused the Polish government of compromising with Germany because through this false defamation campaign it wanted to force the Soviet government to grant land at the expense of the interests of Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Belarus and Soviet Lithuania. At the end of the note, it was stated that the Soviet Union would break diplomatic relations with Poland [10,p.325].

The leaders of Poland tried not to inflame the conflict with the militant ally. Thus, the Katyn problem is closed.

Neither the exposure of the personality cult of Stalin, nor the "thaw" during the reign of N.S.Khrushchev influenced the disclosure of the Katyn secret. On March 9,



1965, the head of the State Security Committee A. Shelepin reported to N. S. Khrushchev that "the entire operation to eliminate the eyes of Polish officers was carried out on the basis of a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of March 5, 1940. All of them were sentenced to the most severe punishment on the basis of registration cases opened in 1939 as prisoners of war and those who lost their will. Since the time of this operation, that is, since 1940, 21,857 cases have been stored in a firmly fixed room, and no one has been given certificates on these cases,"he claims. Especially important documents on this case were placed in folder No. 1 and transferred to special storage. Each new head of state and party, after familiarizing himself with these documents, put them in a glued bag, put the signature of the responsible person and hid them. Since December 24, 1991, these documents have been under the heading "special folder", "do not open without the permission of the Office of the president of the USSR. Let the definitions not be given" [11, p.138]. Consequently, as the leaders of the USSR changed, each new leader learned the secret of Katyn.

And in Polish memory, this tragedy serves as an attempt to destroy the Polish elite. Most of the officers who died in Katyn had higher education, in fact they were the elite of their country. Polish emigrants in Western countries never forgot the Katyn problem. On July 14, 1987, several Polish organizations in Switzerland, on behalf of the Polish diaspora, M.S. He wrote a letter to Gorbachev about the need to determine the fate of the Polish officers killed in the Katyn Forest [12,p.82]. In 1985, after the meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, V. Yaruzelsky and M.S. Gorbachev's meeting was held. Members of the Commission established in 1988 are Soviet scientists professors Ya. Matsishevskiy, Ch. Madajchik, R. Nazarevich and M. After Wojciechowski submitted a document proving that Polish officers were killed by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and it was published in Poland in 1989, the Katyn issue began to rise again.

The investigation into the graves, which began in 1990, was stopped by the Strasjurg court in 2004. The order to terminate the investigation was considered confidential and so far neither the text of the court nor the materials of the investigation have been available to applicants.

In 1994, Poland signed agreements with the Ukrainian and Russian authorities regarding the construction of Polish military cemeteries. Military cemeteries are located in such regions as Katyn, Mednoye, Kharkov and bykovnya (Ukraine). The Polish military cemetery in Katyn was opened on July 28, 2000 (about 4,400 victims of the Kozelsk camp); the cemetery for victims of totalitarianism in Kharkov was opened on June 17, 2000 (about 3,800 victims of the camp in the Starobelsky camp and about 500 unidentified victims); the Polish military cemetery in Mednoye was opened on September 2, 2000 (about 6,300 victims of the Ostashkov camp); The Polish military cemetery in bykovna was opened on September 21, 2012 (Polish citizens in 1992) [13,p.219].

Thus, the question of the Katyn tragedy remains an unresolved issue for the Polish side and continues to exacerbate Russian-Polish relations, despite the fact that their compatriots opened cemeteries at the place of their deaths. If the Russian side approaches this issue from its own position, then the poles and Germans have their own, and these positions contradict each other. Therefore, this issue needs a comprehensive



discussion and solution so that the mistakes of the past do not affect the fruitful, friendly relations between today's countries.

### *Conclusion*

In addition to the unfinished status of its research history, the Katyn shooting is a part of the Russian-Polish confrontation, the political life of Poland, despite the fact that it was a post-war event.

There are Polish-western, German and Russian versions of the Katyn kasiret. Summing up the results by comparing the three options, we can see that there is a strong political background in all respects. The German command unilaterally used the killed Poles as a propaganda tool, the Soviet leadership, in turn, could not allow the recognition of the German point of view, since this version, "promoted" by Goebbels, undermined the reputation of the USSR. The allies, in turn, did not mind the presence of some negative compromises in the event of possible future disagreements with the Soviet Union. The poles, given the complexity of Russian-Polish relations, were ready to believe anything, and most importantly, the Soviet Union was to blame. In general, we come to the conclusion that it is too early to stop studying the Katyn tragedy. We hope that over time, the lost facts will be revealed, the necessary documents will be opened and new evidence will be found. In addition, for an objective investigation, the political component must be eliminated, the parties must be objective. We believe that each country will win its position from a historical point of view, and this event will receive a true assessment in the history of Russian-Polish relations.

### **REFERENCES**

- [1] Tragediya vojny. Gumanitarnoe izmerenie vooruzhennykh konfliktov XX veka [The tragedy of the war. The humanitarian dimension of armed conflicts of the twentieth century]. *Otv. Red. K.A. Pahalyuk. - Moskva: YAUza, 2021. 656* [in Russian].
- [2] Katyn'. Plenniki neob'yavlennoj vojny. Dokumenty i materialy [Katyn. Prisoners of undeclared war. Documents and materials]. *Pod red. R.G. Pihoi i A. Gejshitora. Sost. N.S. Lebedeva, H.A. Petrosova, B. Voshchinskij, V. Materskij. M.: MFD, 1999. 608* [in Russian].
- [3] Lebedeva, N.S. (2021). Katyn': prestuplenie protiv chelovechestva [Katyn: a crime against humanity]. M.: Kul'tura, 352 [in Russian].
- [4] Katynskaya drama. Kozel'sk, Starobel'sk, Ostashkov: sud'ba internirovannykh pol'skih voennosluzhashchih [Katyn drama. Kozelsk, Starobelsk, Ostashkov: the fate of interned Polish soldiers]. *Sost. O.V. Yasnova. M.: Politizdat, 1991, 240* [in Russian].
- [5] Dokladnaya zapiska narkoma vnutrennih del SSSR L.P. Berii I.V. Stalinu [Dokladnaya zapiska People's Commissar of the Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin]. *RGASPI. F.17. Op.166. D.621. L.130. [Elektronnyj resurs] - Rezhim dostupa: <http://new.rusarchives.ru/publication/katyn/01.shtml> (data obrashcheniya 27.07.2024).* [in Russian].
- [6] Tajny Katynskoj tragedii [Secrets of the Katyn tragedy].// *Otv. za vyp. V.I. Ilyuhin. -M.: Politicheskoe prosveshchenie, 2010.-200* [in Russian].
- [7] Prudnikova, E. (2019). Katyn'. Lozh', stavshaya istoriej [Katyn. A lie that has become history]. M.: Veche, 212 [in Russian].





[8] Brychkov, A.S., Nikonorov, G.A. (2016). Katynskij sled v rossijsko-pol'skih otnosheniyah: Istoriya i sovremennost' [The Katyn trail in Russian-Polish Relations: History and Modernity]. *ZHurnal «Vestnik Polesskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta»*, №1., 3-14 [in Russian].

[9] Muhin, YU.I. (2003). Antirossijskaya podlost'. Nauchno-istoricheskiy analiz [Anti-Russian meanness. Scientific and historical analysis].- *M.: Krymskiy most-9d D. Forum*, 762 [in Russian].

[10] Shved, V. N. (2010). Tajna Katyni, ili Zlobnyj vystrel v Rossiyu [The Mystery of Katyn, or a Vicious Shot at Russia]. - *M.: Algoritm*, 544 [in Russian].

[11] Zapiska predsedatelya KGB pri SM SSSR A.N. Shelepina N.S. Hrushchevu [Zapiska Chairman of the KGB under the CM of the USSR A.N. Shelepina N.S. Khrushchev]. *RGASPI. F.17. Op.166. D.621. L.138. [Elektronnyj resurs] - Rezhim dostupa: <http://new.rusarchives.ru/publication/katyn/05.shtml>(data obrashcheniya 27.07.2024)* [in Russian].

[12] Grover, F. (2022). Tajna Katynskogo rasstrela. Dokazatel'stva, razgadka [The mystery of the Katyn massacre. Evidence, a clue]. *Moskva.:Rodina*, 304 [in Russian].

[13] Cynman, I. (2011). Pamyati zhertv Katynskogo lesa. Iz tragedij XX veka [In memory of the victims of the Katyn forest. From the tragedies of the XX century]. *Smolensk*, 223 [in Russian].

### **Журасова А.Ш., Булатов И.А. КАТЫНЬ ҚАСІРЕТІНІҢ ТАРИХЫ**

**Андатпа.** Екінші дүниежүзілік соғыстың тарихында орын алатын саяси мәселелер өте көп, соның бірі - Катынь қасіреті. Ол XX ғасырдағы жаппай қырғынның бірі ретінде тарихта орын алды. Осыған орай мақалада екінші дүниежүзілік соғыстың бастапқа кезеңінде орын алған поляк әскерилеріне қатысты болған қасіретті Катын оқиғасының тарихы баяндалады. Мақалада оқиға тарихы мен оған қатысты мемлекеттердің ұстанымдарына, Катынь қырғынының тарихи ерекшеліктері мен маңызына талдама жасалады. Мақала жаңашылдығы ғылыми зерттеулерге сүйене отырып Катынь тарихына қатысты нұсқаларға талдау жасау.

**Кілт сөздер:** Катынь; соғыс; қасірет; офицер; тұтқын; КСРО; НКВД; конвенция; Қызыл Крест; Страсбург соты.

### **Журасова А.Ш., Булатов И.А. ИСТОРИЯ КАТЫНЬСКОЙ ТРАГЕДИИ**

**Аннотация.** В истории Второй мировой войны имеет место множество политических проблем, одной из которых является Катынская трагедия. Оно вошло в историю как одно из массовых убийств XX века. В данной статье описывается история трагического Катынского инцидента, произошедшего в начале Второй мировой войны в рамках политического репрессирования и подавления польского сопротивления. В статье анализируется история события и позиции государств относительно него, исторические особенности и значение Катынского расстрела. Новизна статьи заключается в анализе широкого круга научных исследования и различных версий, связанных с историей Катыни.

**Ключевые слова:** Катынь; война; трагедия; офицер; заключенный; СССР; НКВД; конвенция; Красный Крест; Страсбургский суд.